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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been found
to be vulnerable to adversarial examples resulting
from adding small-magnitude perturbations to in-
puts. Such adversarial examples can mislead DNNs
to produce adversary-selected results. Different at-
tack strategies have been proposed to generate ad-
versarial examples, but how to produce them with
high perceptual quality and more efficiently re-
quires more research efforts. In this paper, we
propose AdvGAN to generate adversarial exam-
ples with generative adversarial networks (GANs),
which can learn and approximate the distribution
of original instances. For AdvGAN, once the gen-
erator is trained, it can generate perturbations effi-
ciently for any instance, so as to potentially acceler-
ate adversarial training as defenses. We apply Adv-
GAN in both semi-whitebox and black-box attack
settings. In semi-whitebox attacks, there is no need
to access the original target model after the gener-
ator is trained, in contrast to traditional white-box
attacks. In black-box attacks, we dynamically train
a distilled model for the black-box model and op-
timize the generator accordingly. Adversarial ex-
amples generated by AdvGAN on different target
models have high attack success rate under state-
of-the-art defenses compared to other attacks. Our
attack has placed the first with 92.76% accuracy on
a public MNIST black-box attack challenge.1
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved great suc-
cesses in a variety of applications. However, recent work has
demonstrated that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial per-
turbations [Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Hu and Tan, 2017]. An adversary can add small-magnitude
perturbations to inputs and generate adversarial examples to
mislead DNNs. Such maliciously perturbed instances can
cause the learning system to misclassify them into either
∗This work was performed when Chaowei Xiao was at JD.COM
and University of California, Berkeley
1https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge
a maliciously-chosen target class (in a targeted attack) or
classes that are different from the ground truth (in an untar-
geted attack). Different algorithms have been proposed for
generating such adversarial examples, such as the fast gra-
dient sign method (FGSM) [Goodfellow et al., 2015] and
optimization-based methods (Opt.) [Carlini and Wagner,
2017b; Liu et al., 2017; Xiao et al., 2018; Evtimov et al.,
2017].
Most of the the current attack algorithms [Carlini and Wag-
ner, 2017b; Liu et al., 2017] rely on optimization schemes
with simple pixel space metrics, such as L∞ distance from
a benign image, to encourage visual realism. To generate
more perceptually realistic adversarial examples efficiently,
in this paper, we propose to train (i) a feed-forward network
that generate perturbations to create diverse adversarial ex-
amples and (ii) a discriminator network to ensure that the
generated examples are realistic. We apply generative adver-
sarial networks (GANs) [Goodfellow et al., 2014] to produce
adversarial examples in both the semi-whitebox and black-
box settings. As conditional GANs are capable of produc-
ing high-quality images [Isola et al., 2017], we apply a simi-
lar paradigm to produce perceptually realistic adversarial in-
stances. We name our method AdvGAN.
Note that in the previous white-box attacks, such as FGSM
and optimization methods, the adversary needs to have white-
box access to the architecture and parameters of the model all
the time. However, by deploying AdvGAN, once the feed-
forward network is trained, it can instantly produce adversar-
ial perturbations for any input instances without requiring ac-
cess to the model itself anymore. We name this attack setting
semi-whitebox.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our attack strategy Adv-
GAN , we first generate adversarial instances based on Adv-
GAN and other attack strategies on different target mod-
els. We then apply the state-of-the-art defenses to defend
against these generated adversarial examples [Goodfellow et
al., 2015; Ma˛dry et al., 2017]. We evaluate these attack strate-
gies in both semi-whitebox and black-box settings. We show
that adversarial examples generated by AdvGAN can achieve
a high attack success rate, potentially due to the fact that these
adversarial instances appear closer to real instances compared
to other recent attack strategies.
Our contributions are listed as follows.
• Different from the previous optimization-based meth-
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ods, we train a conditional adversarial network to di-
rectly produce adversarial examples, which not only
results in perceptually realistic examples that achieve
state-of-the-art attack success rate against different tar-
get models, but also the generation process is more effi-
cient.
• We show that AdvGAN can attack black-box models
by training a distilled model. We propose to dynam-
ically train the distilled model with query information
and achieve high black-box attack success rate and tar-
geted black-box attack, which is difficult to achieve for
transferability-based black-box attacks.
• We use the state-of-the-art defense methods to defend
against adversarial examples and show that AdvGAN
achieves much higher attack success rate under current
defenses.
• We apply AdvGAN on Ma˛dry et al.’s MNIST challenge
(2017) and achieve 88.93% accuracy on the published
robust model in the semi-whitebox setting and 92.76%
in the black-box setting, which wins the top position in
the challenge.
2 Related Work
Here we review recent work on adversarial examples and gen-
erative adversarial networks.
Adversarial Examples A number of attack strategies to
generate adversarial examples have been proposed in the
white-box setting, where the adversary has full access to the
classifier [Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Carlini and Wagner, 2017b; Xiao et al., 2018; Hu and Tan,
2017]. Goodfellow et al. propose the fast gradient sign
method (FGSM), which applies a first-order approximation
of the loss function to construct adversarial samples. For-
mally, given an instance x, an adversary generates adversar-
ial example xA = x + η with L∞ constraints in the un-
targeted attack setting as η =  · sign(∇x`f (x, y)), where
`f (·) is the cross-entropy loss used to train the neural net-
work f , and y represents the ground truth of x. Opti-
mization based methods (Opt) have also been proposed to
optimize adversarial perturbation for targeted attacks while
satisfying certain constraints [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b;
Liu et al., 2017]. Its goal is to minimize the objective function
as ||η|| + λ`f (xA, y), where || · || is an appropriately chosen
norm function. However, the optimization process is slow
and can only optimize perturbation for one specific instance
each time. In contrast, our method uses feed-forward network
to generate an adversarial image, rather than an optimization
procedure. Our method achieves higher attack success rate
against different defenses and performs much faster than the
current attack algorithms.
Independently from our work, feed-forward networks have
been applied to generate adversarial perturbation [Baluja and
Fischer, 2017]. However, Baluja and Fischer combine the
re-ranking loss and an L2 norm loss, aiming to constrain the
generated adversarial instance to be close to the original one
in terms of L2; while we apply a deep neural network as a
discriminator to help distinguish the instance with other real
images to encourage the perceptual quality of the generated
adversarial examples . Hu and Tan[Hu and Tan, 2017] also
proposed to use GAN to generate adversarial examples. How-
ever, they aim to generate adversarial examples for malware
while our work focus on generating perceptual realistic ad-
versarial examples for image.
Black-box Attacks Current learning systems usually do
not allow white-box accesses against the model for security
reasons. Therefore, there is a great need for black-box attacks
analysis.
Most of the black-box attack strategies are based on the
transferability phenomenon [Papernot et al., 2016], where an
adversary can train a local model first and generate adversar-
ial examples against it, hoping the same adversarial examples
will also be able to attack the other models. Many learning
systems allow query accesses to the model. However, there
is little work that can leverage query-based access to target
models to construct adversarial samples and move beyond
transferability. Hu and Tan proposed to leverage GANs to
construct evasion instance for malware. Papernot et al. pro-
posed to train a local substitute model with queries to the tar-
get model to generate adversarial samples, but this strategy
still relies on transferability. In contrast, we show that the
proposed AdvGAN can perform black-box attacks without
depending on transferability.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) Goodfellow
et al. have achieved visually appealing results in both im-
age generation and manipulation [Zhu et al., 2016] settings.
Recently, image-to-image conditional GANs have further im-
proved the quality of synthesis results [Isola et al., 2017]. We
adopt a similar adversarial loss and image-to-image network
architecture to learn the mapping from an original image to
a perturbed output such that the perturbed image cannot be
distinguished from real images in the original class. Differ-
ent from prior work, we aim to produce output results that
are not only visually realistic but also able to mislead target
learning models.
3 Generating Adversarial Examples with
Adversarial Networks
3.1 Problem Definition
Let X ⊆ Rn be the feature space, with n the number of fea-
tures. Suppose that (xi, yi) is the ith instance within the train-
ing set, which is comprised of feature vectors xi ∈ X , gen-
erated according to some unknown distribution xi ∼ Pdata,
and yi ∈ Y the corresponding true class labels. The learning
system aims to learn a classifier f : X → Y from the domain
X to the set of classification outputs Y , where |Y| denotes the
number of possible classification outputs. Given an instance
x, the goal of an adversary is to generate adversarial exam-
ple xA, which is classified as f(xA) 6= y (untargeted attack),
where y denotes the true label; or f(xA) = t (targeted at-
tack) where t is the target class. xA should also be close to
the original instance x in terms of L2 or other distance metric.
3.2 AdvGAN Framework
Figure 1 illustrates the overall architecture of AdvGAN,
which mainly consists of three parts: a generator G, a discrim-
inator D, and the target neural network f . Here the generator
Figure 1: Overview of AdvGAN
G takes the original instance x as its input and generates a
perturbation G(x). Then x+G(x) will be sent to the discrim-
inator D, which is used to distinguish the generated data and
the original instance x. The goal ofD is to encourage that the
generated instance is indistinguishable with the data from its
original class. To fulfill the goal of fooling a learning model,
we first perform the white-box attack, where the target model
is f in this case. f takes x+ G(x) as its input and outputs its
loss Ladv , which represents the distance between the predic-
tion and the target class t (targeted attack), or the opposite of
the distance between the prediction and the ground truth class
(untargeted attack).
The adversarial loss [Goodfellow et al., 2014] can be writ-
ten as:2
LGAN = Ex logD(x) + Ex log(1−D(x+ G(x))). (1)
Here, the discriminator D aims to distinguish the perturbed
data x+G(x) from the original data x. Note that the real data
is sampled from the true class, so as to encourage that the
generated instances are close to data from the original class.
The loss for fooling the target model f in a targeted attack
is: Lfadv = Ex`f (x+ G(x), t), (2)
where t is the target class and `f denotes the loss function
(e.g., cross-entropy loss) used to train the original model f .
The Lfadv loss encourages the perturbed image to be misclas-
sified as target class t. Here we can also perform the untar-
geted attack by maximizing the distance between the predic-
tion and the ground truth, but we will focus on the targeted
attack in the rest of the paper.
To bound the magnitude of the perturbation, which is a
common practice in prior work [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b;
Liu et al., 2017], we add a soft hinge loss on the L2 norm as
Lhinge = Exmax(0, ‖G(x)‖2 − c), (3)
where c denotes a user-specified bound. This can also sta-
bilize the GAN’s training, as shown in Isola et al. (2017).
Finally, our full objective can be expressed as
L = Lfadv + αLGAN + βLhinge, (4)
where α and β control the relative importance of each ob-
jective. Note that LGAN here is used to encourage the per-
turbed data to appear similar to the original data x, while Lfadv
is leveraged to generate adversarial examples, optimizing for
the high attack success rate. We obtain our G and D by solv-
ing the minmax game argminG maxD L. Once G is trained
2For simplicity, we denote the Ex ≡ Ex∼Pdata
on the training data and the target model, it can produce per-
turbations for any input instance to perform a semi-whitebox
attack.
3.3 Black-box Attacks with Adversarial Networks
Static Distillation For black-box attack, we assume adver-
saries have no prior knowledge of training data or the model
itself. In our experiments in Section 4, we randomly draw
data that is disjoint from the training data of the black-box
model to distill it, since we assume the adversaries have no
prior knowledge about the training data or the model. To
achieve black-box attacks, we first build a distilled network
f based on the output of the black-box model b [Hinton et al.,
2015]. Once we obtain the distilled network f , we carry out
the same attack strategy as described in the white-box setting
(see Equation (4)). Here, we minimize the following network
distillation objective:
argmin
f
Ex H(f(x), b(x)), (5)
where f(x) and b(x) denote the output from the distilled
model and black-box model respectively for the given train-
ing image x, andH denotes the commonly used cross-entropy
loss. By optimizing the objective over all the training images,
we can obtain a model f which behaves very close to the
black-box model b. We then carry out the attack on the dis-
tilled network.
Note that unlike training the discriminator D, where we
only use the real data from the original class to encourage
that the generated instance is close to its original class, here
we train the distilled model with data from all classes.
Dynamic Distillation Only training the distilled model
with all the pristine training data is not enough, since it is un-
clear how close the black-box and distilled model perform on
the generated adversarial examples, which have not appeared
in the training set before. Here we propose an alternative
minimization approach to dynamically make queries and train
the distilled model f and our generator G jointly. We perform
the following two steps in each iteration. During iteration i:
1. Update Gi given a fixed network fi−1: We follow
the white-box setting (see Equation 4) and train the
generator and discriminator based on a previously dis-
tilled model fi−1. We initialize the weights Gi as Gi−1.
Gi, Di = argminG maxD Lfi−1adv + αLGAN + βLhinge
2. Update fi given a fixed generator Gi: First, we use
fi−1 to initialize fi. Then, given the generated adver-
sarial examples x + Gi(x) from Gi, the distilled model
fi will be updated based on the set of new query results
for the generated adversarial examples against the black-
box model, as well as the original training images.
fi = argminf ExH(f(x), b(x)) + ExH(f(x +
Gi(x)), b(x + Gi(x))), where we use both the original
images x and the newly generated adversarial examples
x+ sGi(x) to update f .
In the experiment section, we compare the performance of
both the static and dynamic distillation approaches and ob-
serve that simultaneously updating G and f produces higher
attack performance. See Table 2 for more details.
FGSM Opt. Trans. AdvGAN
Run time 0.06s >3h - <0.01s
Targeted Attack X X Ens. X
Black-box Attack X X
Table 1: Comparison with the state-of-the-art attack methods. Run
time is measured for generating 1,000 adversarial instances during
test time. Opt. represents the optimization based method, and Trans.
denotes black-box attacks based on transferability.
MNIST(%) CIFAR-10(%)
Model A B C ResNetWide ResNet
Accuracy (p) 99.0 99.2 99.1 92.4 95.0
Attack Success Rate (w) 97.9 97.1 98.3 94.7 99.3
Attack Success Rate (b-D)93.4 90.1 94.0 78.5 81.8
Attack Success Rate (b-S) 30.7 66.6 87.3 10.3 13.3
Table 2: Accuracy of different models on pristine data, and the at-
tack success rate of adversarial examples generated against different
models by AdvGAN on MNIST and CIFAR-10. p: pristine test data;
w: semi-whitebox attack; b-D: black-box attack with dynamic distil-
lation strategy; b-S: black-box attack with static distillation strategy.
4 Experimental Results
In this section, we first evaluate AdvGAN for both semi-
whitebox and black-box settings on MNIST [LeCun and
Cortes, 1998] and CIFAR-10 [Krizhevsky and Hinton, 2009].
We also perform a semi-whitebox attack on the ImageNet
dataset [Deng et al., 2009]. We then apply AdvGAN to gen-
erate adversarial examples on different target models and test
the attack success rate for them under the state-of-the-art de-
fenses and show that our method can achieve higher attack
success rates compared to other existing attack strategies. We
generate all adversarial examples for different attack methods
under an L∞ bound of 0.3 on MNIST and 8 on CIFAR-10,
for a fair comparison. In general, as shown in Table 1, Adv-
GAN has several advantages over other white-box and black-
box attacks. For instance, regarding computation efficiency,
AdvGAN performs much faster than others even including
the efficient FGSM, although AdvGAN needs extra training
time to train the generator. All these strategies can perform
targeted attack except transferability based attack, although
the ensemble strategy can help to improve. Besides, FGSM
and optimization methods can only perform white-box attack,
while AdvGAN is able to attack in semi-whitebox setting.
Implementation Details We adopt similar architectures for
generator and discriminator with image-to-image translation
literature [Isola et al., 2017; Zhu et al., 2017]. We apply
the loss in Carlini and Wagner (2017b) as our loss Lfadv =
max(maxi6=t f(xA)i−f(xA)t, κ), where t is the target class,
and f represents the target network in the semi-whitebox set-
ting and the distilled model in the black-box setting. We set
the confidence κ = 0 for both Opt. and AdvGAN. We use
a batch size of 128 and a learning rate of 0.001. For GANs
training, we use the least squares objective proposed by LS-
GAN [Mao et al., 2017], as it has been shown to produce
better results with more stable training.
Models Used in the Experiments For MNIST we generate
adversarial examples for three models, where models A and
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Figure 2: Adversarial examples generated from the same original
image to different targets by AdvGAN on MNIST. Row 1: semi-
whitebox attack; Row 2: black-box attack. Left to right: models A,
B, and C.On the diagonal, the original images are shown, and the
numer on the top denote the targets.
B are used in Tramèr et al. (2017). Model C is the target
network architecture used in Carlini and Wagner (2017b). For
CIFAR-10, we select ResNet-32 and Wide ResNet-34 [He et
al., 2016; Zagoruyko and Komodakis, 2016]. Specifically, we
use a 32-layer ResNet implemented in TensorFlow3 and Wide
ResNet derived from the variant of “w32-10 wide.”4 We show
the classification accuracy of pristine MNIST and CIFAR-10
test data (p) and attack success rate of adversarial examples
generated by AdvGAN on different models in Table 2.
4.1 AdvGAN in semi-whitebox Setting
We evaluate AdvGAN on f with different architectures for
MNIST and CIFAR-10. We first apply AdvGAN to perform
semi-whitebox attack against different models on MNIST
dataset. From the performance of semi-whitebox attack (At-
tack Rate (w)) in Table 2, we can see that AdvGAN is able to
generate adversarial instances to attack all models with high
attack success rate.
We also generate adversarial examples from the same orig-
inal instance x, targeting other different classes, as shown in
Figures 2. In the semi-whitebox setting on MNIST (a)-(c),
we can see that the generated adversarial examples for differ-
ent models appear close to the ground truth/pristine images
(lying on the diagonal of the matrix).
In addition, we analyze the attack success rate based on
different loss functions on MNIST. Under the same bounded
perturbations (0.3), if we replace the full loss function in (4)
with L = ||G(x)||2 + Lfadv, which is similar to the objective
used in Baluja and Fischer, the attack success rate becomes
86.2%. If we replace the loss function with L = Lhinge +
Lfadv, the attack success rate is 91.1%, compared to that of
AdvGAN, 98.3%.
Similarly, on CIFAR-10, we apply the same semi-whitebox
attack for ResNet and Wide ResNet based on AdvGAN, and
3github.com/tensorflow/models/blob/master/research/ResNet
4github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge/blob/master/model.py
(a) Semi-whitebox attack (b) Black-box attack
Figure 3: Adversarial examples generated by AdvGAN on CIFAR-
10 for (a) semi-whitebox attack and (b) black-box attack. Image
from each class is perturbed to other different classes. On the diag-
onal, the original images are shown.
Figure 3 (a) shows some adversarial examples, which are per-
ceptually realistic.
We show adversarial examples for the same original in-
stance targeting different other classes. It is clear that with
different targets, the adversarial examples keep similar visual
quality compared to the pristine instances on the diagonal.
4.2 AdvGAN in Black-box Setting
Our black-box attack here is based on dynamic distillation
strategy. We construct a local model to distill model f , and
we select the architecture of Model C as our local model.
Note that we randomly select a subset of instances disjoint
from the training data of AdvGAN to train the local model;
that is, we assume the adversaries do not have any prior
knowledge of the training data or the model itself. With the
dynamic distillation strategy, the adversarial examples gener-
ated by AdvGAN achieve an attack success rate, above 90%
for MNIST and 80% for CIFAR-10, compared to 30% and
10% with the static distillation approach, as shown in Table 2.
We apply AdvGAN to generate adversarial examples for
the same instance targeting different classes on MNIST and
randomly select some instances to show in Figure 2 (d)-(f).
By comparing with the pristine instances on the diagonal, we
can see that these adversarial instances can achieve high per-
ceptual quality as the original digits. Specifically, the orig-
inal digit is somewhat highlighted by adversarial perturba-
tions, which implies a type of perceptually realistic manipu-
lation. Figure 3(b) shows similar results for adversarial ex-
amples generated on CIFAR-10. These adversarial instances
appear photo-realistic compared with the original ones on the
diagonal.
4.3 Attack Effectiveness Under Defenses
Facing different types of attack strategies, various defenses
have been provided. Among them, different types of adver-
sarial training methods are the most effective. Other cate-
gories of defenses, such as those which pre-process an in-
put have mostly been defeated by adaptive attacks [He et al.,
2017; Carlini and Wagner, 2017a]. Goodfellow et al. first
propose adversarial training as an effective way to improve
the robustness of DNNs, and Tramèr et al. extend it to en-
semble adversarial learning. Ma˛dry et al. have also proposed
robust networks against adversarial examples based on well-
defined adversaries. Given the fact that AdvGAN strives to
generate adversarial instances from the underlying true data
distribution, it can essentially produce more photo-realistic
adversarial perturbations compared with other attack strate-
gies. Thus, AdvGAN could have a higher chance to produce
adversarial examples that are resilient under different defense
methods. In this section, we quantitatively evaluate this prop-
erty for AdvGAN compared with other attack strategies.
Threat Model As shown in the literature, most of the cur-
rent defense strategies are not robust when attacking against
them [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b; He et al., 2017]. Here we
consider a weaker threat model, where the adversary is not
aware of the defenses and directly tries to attack the original
learning model, which is also the first threat model analyzed
in Carlini and Wagner. In this case, if an adversary can still
successfully attack the model, it implies the robustness of the
attack strategy. Under this setting, we first apply different at-
tack methods to generate adversarial examples based on the
original model without being aware of any defense. Then we
apply different defenses to directly defend against these ad-
versarial instances.
Semi-whitebox Attack First, we consider the semi-
whitebox attack setting, where the adversary has white-box
access to the model architecture as well as the parameters.
Here, we replace f in Figure 1 with our model A, B, and C, re-
spectively. As a result, adversarial examples will be generated
against different models. We use three adversarial training
defenses to train different models for each model architecture:
standard FGSM adversarial training (Adv.) [Goodfellow et
al., 2015], ensemble adversarial training (Ens.) [Tramèr et
al., 2017],5 and iterative training (Iter. Adv.) [Ma˛dry et al.,
2017]. We evaluate the effectiveness of these attacks against
these defended models. In Table 3, we show that the attack
success rate of adversarial examples generated by AdvGAN
on different models is higher than those of FGSM and Opt.
[Carlini and Wagner, 2017b].
Black-box Attack For AdvGAN, we use model B as the
black-box model and train a distilled model to perform black-
box attack against model B and report the attack success rate
in Table 4. For the black-box attack comparison purpose,
transferability based attack is applied for FGSM and Opt. We
use FGSM and Opt. to attack model A on MNIST, and we use
these adversarial examples to test on model B and report the
corresponding classification accuracy. We can see that the ad-
versarial examples generated by the black-box AdvGAN con-
sistently achieve much higher attack success rate compared
with other attack methods.
For CIFAR-10, we use a ResNet as the black-box model
and train a distilled model to perform black-box attack against
the ResNet. To evaluate black-box attack for optimization
method and FGSM, we use adversarial examples generated
5 Each ensemble adversarially trained model is trained using (i)
pristine training data, (ii) FGSM adversarial examples generated for
the current model under training, and (iii) FGSM adversarial ex-
amples generated for naturally trained models of two architectures
different from the model under training.
Data Model Defense FGSM Opt. AdvGAN
M
N
I
S
T
A
Adv. 4.3% 4.6% 8.0%
Ens. 1.6% 4.2% 6.3%
Iter.Adv. 4.4% 2.96% 5.6%
B
Adv. 6.0% 4.5% 7.2%
Ens. 2.7% 3.18% 5.8%
Iter.Adv. 9.0% 3.0% 6.6%
C
Adv. 2.7% 2.95% 18.7%
Ens. 1.6% 2.2% 13.5%
Iter.Adv. 1.6% 1.9% 12.6%
C
I
F
A
R
10
ResNet
Adv. 13.10% 11.9% 16.03%
Ens. 10.00% 10.3% 14.32%
Iter.Adv 22.8% 21.4% 29.47%
Wide
ResNet
Adv. 5.04% 7.61% 14.26%
Ens. 4.65% 8.43% 13.94 %
Iter.Adv. 14.9% 13.90% 20.75%
Table 3: Attack success rate of adversarial examples generated by
AdvGAN in semi-whitebox setting, and other white-box attacks un-
der defenses on MNIST and CIFAR-10.
MNIST CIFAR-10
Defense FGSM Opt. AdvGAN FGSM Opt. AdvGAN
Adv. 3.1% 3.5% 11.5% 13.58% 10.8% 15.96%
Ens. 2.5% 3.4% 10.3% 10.49% 9.6% 12.47%
Iter.Adv. 2.4% 2.5% 12.2% 22.96% 21.70% 24.28%
Table 4: Attack success rate of adversarial examples generated by
different black-box adversarial strategies under defenses on MNIST
and CIFAR-10
Method Accuracy (xent loss) Accuracy (cw loss)
FGSM 95.23% 96.29%
PGD 93.66% 93.79%
Opt - 91.69%
AdvGAN - 88.93%
Table 5: Accuracy of the MadryLab public model under different
attacks in white-box setting. AdvGAN here achieved the best per-
formance.
by attacking Wide ResNet and test them on ResNet to report
black-box attack results for these two methods.
In addition, we apply AdvGAN to the MNIST challenge.
Among all the standard attacks shown in Table 5, AdvGAN
achieve 88.93% in the white-box setting.
Among reported black-box attacks, AdvGAN achieved an
accuracy of 92.76%, outperforming all other state-of-the-art
attack strategies submitted to the challenge.
4.4 High Resolution Adversarial Examples
To evaluate AdvGAN’s ability of generating high resolution
adversarial examples, we attack against Inception_v3 and
quantify attack success rate and perceptual realism of gen-
erated adversarial examples.
Experiment settings. In the following experiments, we se-
lect 100 benign images from the DEV dataset of the NIPS
2017 adversarial attack competition [Kurakin et al., 2018].
This competition provided a dataset compatible with Ima-
geNet. We generate adversarial examples (299×299 pixels),
each targeting a random incorrect class, with L∞ bounded
(a) Strawberry (b) Toy poodle
(c) Buckeye (d) Toy poodle
Figure 4: Examples from an ImageNet-compatible set, and the la-
bels denote corresponding classification results Left: original benign
images; right: adversarial images generated by AdvGAN against In-
ception_v3.
within 0.01 for Inception_v3. The attack success rate is
100%.
In Figure 4, we show some randomly selected examples of
original and adversarial examples generated by AdvGAN.
Human Perceptual Study. We validate the realism of Adv-
GAN’s adversarial examples with a user study on Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT). We use 100 pairs of original images
and adversarial examples (generated as described above) and
ask workers to choose which image of a pair is more visually
realistic.
Our study follows a protocol from Isola et al., where a
worker is shown a pair of images for 2 seconds, then the
worker has unlimited time to decide. We limit each worker
to at most 20 of these tasks. We collected 500 choices, about
5 per pair of images, from 50 workers on AMT. The Adv-
GAN examples were chosen as more realistic than the orig-
inal image in 49.4% ± 1.96% of the tasks (random guess-
ing would result in about 50%). This result show that these
high-resolution AdvGAN adversarial examples are about as
realistic as benign images.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose AdvGAN to generate adversarial
examples using generative adversarial networks (GANs). In
our AdvGAN framework, once trained, the feed-forward gen-
erator can produce adversarial perturbations efficiently. It can
also perform both semi-whitebox and black-box attacks with
high attack success rate. In addition, when we apply Adv-
GAN to generate adversarial instances on different models
without knowledge of the defenses in place, the generated ad-
versarial examples can preserve high perceptual quality and
attack the state-of-the-art defenses with higher attack success
rate than examples generated by the competing methods. This
property makes AdvGAN a promising candidate for improv-
ing adversarial training defense methods.
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